Naked Machinery: The Demystification of Democracy
Keeping the Mechanisms Without the Smoke and Mirrors
Introduction
In one of my earliest political works, The Illusion of Populism,1 I argued that popular sovereignty—the belief that the masses can impose a collective will upon their rulers—is a harmful myth. This view emerged from my engagement with the Italian School of Elite Theory, which arose during periods of political upheaval when traditional power structures were being questioned. Elite Theory posits that a well-organized minority, rather than a nebulous collective, invariably shapes governance.
While popular sovereignty has long been celebrated as the foundation of modern democracy, this essay explores whether electoral mechanisms might, in fact, be better justified as arenas for elite competition rather than expressions of a unified popular will. By re-examining these foundational ideas, we begin to see the subtle interplay between myth and reality in our political institutions.
This school of thought, pioneered by thinkers such as Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels, analyzes politics from the premise that elites—unified, organized minorities—always impose their will upon the majority. The masses, being a collection of separate individuals, can never impose a collective will upon institutional power, let alone conjure a will of their own. As Geraint Perry succinctly put it, “the dominant minority cannot be controlled by the majority wherever democratic mechanisms are used.”2 Ruling elites can only be ousted by other minorities, or counter-elites. Popular sovereignty, as Robert Michels argued, is not possible due to the “immanent oligarchical tendencies in every kind of human organization.”3
In his book The Ruling Class, Mosca wrote that governance—regardless of the form of government—is when “an organized minority imposes its will on the disorganized majority.”4 Therefore, the democratically elected representative is not truly chosen by the people, but rather, has himself elected by influencing the people with the help of powerful allies.
All that being said, we arrive at the central question of this essay: Could democratic mechanisms—elections, referendums, and democratic legislation—still be justified on the basis of Elite Theory rather than that of Popular Sovereignty?
At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive, especially to those raised in societies that revere democratic ideals. Nonetheless, I will demonstrate that elections, when properly understood, function as tools for elite circulation rather than as mechanisms of mass empowerment.
Electoral Mobilization: A Test of Organizational Competence
The ousting of a ruling elite by a counter-elite is a recurring theme in history, as evidenced by the rise and fall of empires and the transitions from one mode of social formation to another. Elite theorists such as Mosca and Pareto have long argued that when ruling classes become mired in complacency, their internal entropy paves the way for more dynamic and capable counter-elites. In practice, electoral mobilization becomes a rigorous test of organizational competence. It is not merely about winning votes but about assembling a coalition that can navigate the complex interplay of public opinion, political resources, and institutional inertia. The evolution of political parties, for instance, serves as a case study in how organized factions can gradually supplant dysfunctional governments without descending into the chaos of bloody revolution or civil war.
Mosca identifies several factors that influence elite circulation: “As soon as there is a shift in the balance of political forces … then the manner in which the ruling class is constituted also changes. If a new source of wealth develops in a society, if the practical importance of knowledge grows, if an old religion declines or a new one is born, if a new current of ideas spreads, then, simultaneously, far-reaching dislocations occur in the ruling class.”5
Pareto’s comprehensive theory of “sentiments and residues” points to a cycle between Machiavelli’s “lions” (who rule through coercion) and “foxes” (who rule through persuasion). When the “lions” become too rigid and incompetent, they are outmaneuvered by the “foxes,” who in turn are later overthrown when they become too weak to enforce their rule.6
Writing from “a Machiavellian point of view,” James Burnham analyzes how an elite turnover would take place in what he called a “social revolution.” This process is when “a comparatively rapid shift in the composition and structure of the elite and in the mode of its relation to the non-elite.” Here, Burnham identifies six “general pre-conditions” under which such a revolution would occur:
When the institutional structure, and the elite which has the ruling position within this structure, are unable to handle possibilities opened up by technological advances and by the growth, for whatever reason, of new social forces.
When a considerable percentage of the ruling class devotees little attention to the business of ruling, and turns its interests to such fields as culture, art, philosophy, and the pursuit of sensuous please.
When an elite is unable or unwilling to assimilate rising new elements from the masses or from its own lower ranks.
When large sections of the elite lose confidence in themselves and the legitimacy of their own rule; and when in both elite and non-elite there is a loss of faith in the political formulas and myths that have held the social structure together.
When the ruling class, or much of it, is unable or unwilling to use force in a firm and determined way, and instead tries to rely almost exclusively on manipulation, compromise, deceit, and fraud.7
From all these perspectives, one conclusion becomes clear. No matter how strong, clever, or resourceful a ruling elite may be, Fortuna continues to spin her wheel. Some rotations are faster, some smoother, but they never cease. Elections—when carefully designed and enforced—could serve to make elite circulation more stable. This would ensure that power remains dynamic rather than stagnating in the hands of entrenched incompetents.
One might object by pointing to statistical evidence of high re-election rates, such as those in the United States, which are known to range between 80%—90%.8 However, this is a myopic and oversimplified view of how elite circulation occurs. It is a gradual process that unfolds over generations. No ruling class can be expected to be replaced in short intervals except in moments of anarchy or revolution. But over time, democratic mechanisms allow counter-elites to prove their organizational strength by building support bases, forming coalitions, and navigating the shifting political landscape.
In short, this post-populist democracy would transform elections from expressions of mass will into structured contests of organizational competence.
Brutal Machinery Laid Bare
Once we peel away the comforting illusion of popular sovereignty, electoral contests reveal themselves to be arenas of raw power and strategy. In this post-populist framework, primaries and elections cease to be simple popularity contests. They become tests of how well competing elites can mobilize support, manage resources, and outmaneuver their adversaries. This demystification of democratic processes exposes a fundamental paradox: as society increasingly acknowledges the mechanisms of elite control, it simultaneously fuels a desire for a unifying figure—a plebiscitary Caesar—to restore a sense of order.9
Yet even in such cases, history shows that the machinery of elections persists. The French Empires under Napoleon I and Napoleon III, for instance, retained electoral practices long after the establishment of monarchical rule, suggesting that the apparatus of democracy can adapt to serve governments headed by a powerful royal. A multitude of contemporary and historical examples demonstrate that democratic structures are not necessarily incompatible with monarchical governance. Rather, they can be recontextualized as tools of elite competition within a stable political framework.
Conclusion
In light of the arguments presented above, it becomes evident that democratic mechanisms are not mere symbols of an elusive popular will but are instead sophisticated instruments for structuring elite competition.
Robert Michels concluded Political Parties with a striking passage that deserves to be quoted in full:
“The democratic currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the same shoal. They are ever renewed. This enduring spectacle is simultaneously encouraging and depressing. When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely. Now new accusers arise to denounce the traitors; after an era of glorious combats and of inglorious power, they end by fusing with the old dominant class; whereupon once more they are in turn attacked by fresh opponents who appeal to the name of democracy. It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end.”10
Those who share Michels’ disappointment may perhaps find solace in the notion that the rise and breaking of these “successive waves” are not a “cruel game,” but rather, part of an inevitable and necessary cycle in the circulation of elites.
By stripping away the façade of popular sovereignty, we uncover a political landscape where electoral processes rigorously test the organizational strength and strategic acumen of competing factions. This perspective does not diminish the value of democracy; rather, it reaffirms its importance as a self-correcting mechanism which ensures that leadership remains dynamic and responsive.
In an era marked by rapid technological change and evolving social norms, understanding the true nature of these processes is more critical than ever. If democratic mechanisms are to survive, they must be understood for what they truly are: not vehicles of mass empowerment, but tests of elite fitness. The more we dispel the myth of popular sovereignty, the more we can refine these mechanisms into an efficient, functional system for the continual renewal of governance.
In the long run, embracing the reality of elite competition could pave the way for a more transparent, resilient, and adaptable form of governance—one that continuously renews itself to meet the challenges of its time. However, it is also possible that democracy—without the smoke and mirrors—would be seen as a mechanism ill-suited for the turbulent times we currently face. It remains to be seen if a strong case for democracy can still be made when people no longer view it through rose-tinted lenses.
Whether we choose to reform or replace it, one thing is certain: democracy must be demystified.
References
https://radicalmonarchists.substack.com/p/the-illusion-of-populism
Geraint Perry, Political Elites, p. 31
Robert Michels, Political Parties, p. 11
Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 154
Ibid., p. 65
Neema Parvini breaks this down in his book, The Populist Delusion. (See pages 37 and 38.)
James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, pp. 257-258
https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/reelection-rates
For more information, see my article The Plebiscitarian Path: https://radicalmonarchists.substack.com/p/the-plebiscitarian-path
Robert Michels, Political Parties, p. 408