The Plebiscitarian Path

Rethinking the Struggle for Monarchy Through Democracy

A common error of contemporary monarchists is the idea that the abolition of monarchies can be reversed by playing the rules of republicanism. Their solution would either be holding a referendum or electing their own candidates, nevermind the fact that referendums can be so easily influenced or rigged (like the one in Italy in 1946), nevermind the incredibly high reelection rates (like those in America, which range from 85% to 98% from 1964 to 2022¹). And concealing all this is the smoke of mirrors of Populism, deceiving the disorganized masses into thinking that they could exercise any kind of de facto power.

Here, we face an inescapable truth: the deck is stacked against monarchism. This should come as no surprise considering that those who benefit from the political systems we seek to replace would fight against radical change tooth and nail. It would be naive of us to play by the rules when the rules themselves are rigged in the favor of the powers that be.

However, there is a much more feasible path to monarchism, one that Robert Michels and later James Burnham both referred to as Bonapartism.

By examining Michels' writings on Bonapartism, we will see how this process could benefit (and harm) the cause for monarchy.

To start off, Michels observes that a leader usually begins as “no more than a single molecule of the mass” which has become “detached involuntarily.” In this detachment, “without any personal motive”, this leader “has been pushed forward by a clearer vision, by a profounder sentiment, and by a more ardent desire for the general good…”²

The most prominent examples would be the namesakes of Bonapartism: Napoleon I and Napoleon III.

The former, even after becoming head of state, “desired to be regarded as the chosen of the people.” And so, through a plebiscite, Napoleon I ascended to the throne of France as Emperor. This new monarch, Michels pointed out, “declared that he considered his power to repose exclusively upon the masses.”³

As for Napoleon III, he took the process a step further. Not only did he recognize popular sovereignty as the source of his legitimacy, but also “the theoretical basis of all his practical activities.” He declared himself to be merely “the executive organ of the collective will manifested in the elections.” Therefore, Napoleon III was “entirely at the disposition of that will, prepared in all things to accept its decisions.”⁴

Michels perfectly summarized Bonapartism as the “interpretation of popular sovereignty” in an autocratic form, one that is “conferred by the people in accordance with constitutional rules.”⁵ Think of it as a popular autocracy, a form of Enlightened Despotism in which the autocrat is a mere instrument of his people.

We now come across an interesting paradox. It is the theory in which personal rule stems from “the collective will.” And yet, it tends “to emancipate itself of that will and to become sovereign in its turn.” Bonapartism utilizes its democratic origin as “a shield” from the threats to its legitimacy and power. It reconciles its democratic origin with its autocratic nature by becoming “a regular organ of the popular sovereignty.” Thus, arises “the synthesis of two antagonistic concepts, democracy and autocracy.”⁶ The paradox is resolved.

Michels continues, pointing out how the apparatus of the state would be affected by Bonapartism:

“One of the consequences of the theory of the popular will being subsumed in the supreme executive is that the elements which intervene between the latter and the former, the public officials, that is to say, must be kept in a state of the strictest possible dependence upon the central authority, which, in its, turn, depends upon the people.”⁷

What I find interesting in this passage is the sentence which immediately follows: “The least manifestation of liberty on the part of the bureaucracy would be tantamount to a rebellion against the sovereignty of the citizens.”⁸

This gives one pause and recall how the first and foremost pillar of Project 2025 is the elmination of the “administrative state”, that is, the bloated bureacracy left by Woodrow Wilson. While Donald Trump said that he disagrees with the Heritage Foundation on some issues, it would be remiss of him to not take up the opportunity remove the last surviving remnant of the Wilsonianism.

Now, returning to Robert Michels, he continues: “The most characteristic feature of this view is the idea that the power of the chief of the state rests exclusively upon the direct will of the nation. Bonapartism does not recognise any intermediate links.”⁹

The doing away of these intermediate links would either accelerate the nation to monarchism or totalitarianism. It is here that I must acknowledge that Bonapartism is a Faustian bargain for us monarchists. While it is the natural endpoint of democracy, this process itself has not one but two endpoints. Either it would lead to the rise of a dynasty or that of a totalitarian party. It is a great risk, one that monarchists in their own respective countries must decide whether or not they would take.

And of course, even if we find ourselves in a situation in which a Bonapartist rule arises in our favor, that is not to say that it would be free of tyrannical measures. Francoist Spain immediately comes to mind.

“In theory,” Michels warned, “every act of Bonapartism was perfectly legitimate, even if it led to the shedding of the blood of the citizens. The plebiscite was a purifying bath which gave legitimate sanction to every illegality. Napoleon III, when he received the formal announcement of his triumph in the plebiscite, declared that if in the coup d'etat he had infringed the laws it was only in order to reenter the paths of legality…”¹⁰

And finally, I wish to bring to your attention an interesting benefit of this process. By using popular sovereignty against republicanism, this could sway republicans to run straight into the arms of monarchists!

“This sanction by plebiscite…” Michels explained, “gave to accomodating republicans a ready pretext for passing from the side of the opposition to that of the monarchy. Was not this plebiscitary Caesarism established upon the same foundation as the republic of their dreams?”¹¹

To conclude this brief overview of Bonapartism, we return to James Burnham, who provides a very apt summary: “Bonapartism can be regarded as the logical culmination of democracy. More than this: to judge from the experience not only of our own times but from that of the Greek city-states, the Roman Republic, and the medieval city-states, Bonapartism is likewise the normal—though not perhaps the invariable—historical culmination of democracy. Bonapartism, in one or another stage of development, is the most striking and typical political structure of our day. The great nations which, in the period since the Renaissance, adopted democratic political formulas and representative parliamentary practices, have without exception in this century* exhibited a powerful tendency toward Bonapartism… If Bonapartism, in fact rather than in theory, denies democracy, it does so by bringing democracy to completion.”¹²

Here, I would take it a step further. Bonapartism is not only the natural endpoint of democracy, of republicanism, but also the plebiscitarian path to Monarchism. Rather than playing by rules which are tilted in favor of the system, we could simply let the system run its course or even accelerate it. What more expedient and effective path than to push republicanism to its completion?

The challenge, however, would be finding a Bonapartist leader who would support or at least be open to monarchism. Much like a hereditary monarch, such a find would be a roll of the dice. As staunch as I am in pursuing this course, even I cannot deny that the plebiscitarian path would carry great risk.

However, to monarchists who are hesitant or outright object, I ask a simple question: if not Bonapartism, then what else? Should we go back to playing the rules set by the republicans themselves?

1. https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/reelection-rates

2. Robert Michels, Political Parties, p. 206

3. Ibin., p. 215

4. Ibin., p. 216

5. Ibin., p. 215

6. Ibin., p. 216-217

7. Ibin., p. 219

8. Ibin., p. 219

9. Ibin., p. 219

10. Ibin., p. 219

11. Ibin., p. 219-220

12. James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, p. 179-180

*For context, Burnham wrote this book in 1943.