The Spectre of Monarchism in the East
First Nepal, Next Iran... Now What?
(Image from enjoythewood.com)
Introduction: History Rhymes Again
In his book A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, Orlando Figes painted a vivid picture of the events leading up to, during, and following the cataclysmic October Revolution. Following the Kornilov Affair, the Russian Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the country. In fact, one might say that it was practically non-existent judging by the description Figes gave:
‘The prestige of Kerensky and the Provisional Government’, wrote Kerensky’s wife, ‘was completely destroyed by the Kornilov Affair; and he was left almost without supporters.’ The five-man Directory, which … served as a fragile structure for Kerensky’s own dictatorship …, was made up of unknown mediocrities. … Beyond the corridors of the Winter Palace, all Kerensky’s decrees were ignored. There was a vacuum of power; and it was now only a question of who would dare to fill it."1
But it was not just the Russian people who lost all confidence in Kerensky. The Entente also turned their backs on him. The British Foreign Ministry in particular was “under the absurd impression that … Kerensky himself was about to conclude a separate peace with Germany.”2
Lenin, who was in exile in Finland at the time, smelled blood in the water. He called upon the Bolsheviks to seize power because they had the popular support needed to legitimize their coup. “The majority of the people are on our side,” he insisted, “[I]t would be naive to wait for a ‘formal’ majority for the Bolsheviks.”3
Formed in mid-October, the Bolshevik-led Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) began gathering and organizing soldiers for the coup. Many of its personnel were from the Petrograd garrison, who mutinied in response to a threat of being transferred to the Front. From 21-25 October, the MRC proceeded to seize key buildings in Petrograd, proclaiming itself “to be the ruling authority of the garrison…” And thus, “the Provisional Government was defenseless; and it only remained for the Bolsheviks to walk into the Winter Palace and arrest the ministers.”4
And when the time came for the coup to be executed, it was not some glorious battle of revolutionaries storming a castle. In fact, there was no battle at all. When the Bolsheviks stormed the Winter Palace, they found the building largely abandoned “since most of the [garrison] had already left for home… The only real damage to the imperial residence in the whole affair was a chipped cornice and a shattered window on the third floor.”5
History does not repeat itself, but it certainly rhymes. So I cannot help but think that we will soon see another one of its “rhymes” in the East.
The Situation in Iran
On 17 June 2025, the RadMons were one of the first, if not the first, monarchist group to share reports of Iranian military officers “seeking contact” with their Crown Prince “to defect and pledge allegiance” to him.6 But now this has been noticed by more mainstream outlets.
According to London Daily, “[a] growing number of … Iranian military, police and intelligence officers are reported to have reached out to exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi”7 not just on the day we reported it, but for several days.
“Sources close to Pahlavi’s network,” the report continued, “indicate that the communications include expressions of loyalty to his mission … The contacts have reportedly come from individuals within the regular army, the Republican Guard, police forces and intelligence services.”8
The Iranian theocracy, save for different ideologies and the fact that it is not caught in a world war, is now in a position very identical to that of Kerensky’s government. Infrastructure compromised by the war, lost any semblance of popular support, and—more importantly—losing support of the military, both foot soldiers as well as officers.
It is widely believed that the Ayatollah’s death would trigger a regime change. While I would certainly not refute that, I would take it a step further. Perhaps the Ayatollah does not need to perish for the regime to fall. Kerensky did not need to be pulverized by cannon fire for the Bolsheviks to seize Petrograd. All it may take is a small, well-organized group of pro-Pahlavi soldiers to seize key locations in Tehran.
Of course, this may be a pipe-dream. But then again, I did say in the latest MOA (Monarchists of America) podcast that an Iranian regime change may be a “pipe-dream.” And now, within mere days, that dream is becoming more and more of a reality.
So who knows? Perhaps the gift of prophecy is not entirely lost on me.
The Situation in Nepal
Forgive me if I sound immodest, but here I am proud to say that the RadMons were once again the only monarchist group delivering the news of major political events. This time, it was in Nepal.
On 28 March this year, the Joint People’s Movement Committee, a united front of Nepalese monarchists, organized a massive demonstration at Tinkune, Kathmandu. This event soon devolved into chaos as police proceeded to clash with protestors. Soon after the demonstration was dispersed, the Maoist-led government immediately cracked down. The military was unleashed. Curfew was imposed. Over 100 protesters, including several high-profile royalist leaders, were arrested.9
Returning to the 1917 Revolution in Russia, this setback is somewhat similar to the chaotic demonstrations of the July Days, which were quelled by Kerensky. However, the Bolsheviks maintained internal unity and cohesion more or less. Meanwhile, the Kerensky blundered his way into the Kornliov Affair, thereby splintering his support base and destroying whatever remained of his credibility.
Returning to Nepal, we see yet another similar parallel unfold. On 1 April, the ruling coalition of the Nepalese government was undermined when one of its parties, the Maoist Centre, split ranks and sided with the monarchists over internal disputes.10 Later, around 20 April to 9 May, the King of Nepal held a series of meetings with prominent royalist figures. And in those meetings, he successfully encouraged splintered monarchist groups, a total of 44, to join forces in a single, unified front.11
While Nepal is not in as grave a situation militarily or economically as Iran, this country may not necessarily be far off from a monarchical restoration. It would be a likely, albeit not a foregone, conclusion as long as the monarchists remain united and the internal divisions of their Maoist counterparts perpetuated and exploited.
Conclusion: The Restorationist Undercurrent
History may not repeat, but its rhythms are unmistakable, especially to those who care enough to listen. From the war-torn infrastructure and civil unrest in Tehran to the tottering edifice of corrupt Maoist rule in Kathmandu, we are watching a slow but steady unraveling of revolutionary republics that claim to speak for its peoples. And what emerges from the cracks is not the tired promise of more democracy, but something older, deeper, and—for some—potent: monarchy.
What we are witnessing is not a reactionary fantasy but the reawakening of a dormant political archetype, one that persists wherever revolutionary regimes overstay their welcome and lose their myth. In both Nepal and Iran, cracks are forming, and not merely in governments. Even the very assumption that modern republics are inevitable and eternal is now called into question. And if those cracks continue to widen, they may become gateways through which royal banners return not as nostalgic relics, but as emblems of stability, unity, and legitimacy.
Whether these early stirrings will blossom into full restorations remains to be seen. But if the past has taught us anything, it’s that revolutions don’t end at the ballot box—they end when someone dares to fill the vacuum. In Nepal, in Iran, and perhaps elsewhere, the monarchists are beginning to step forward.
The spectre of monarchism, an ancient spirit the neoliberal world order assumed long dead, is now manifesting itself in the hearts and minds of many brave souls across the world. But it in the East, with its deep and rich history of kingdoms and traditions, where monarchism may soon begin to regain ground. So the question is no longer if there will be another restoration, but where.
References
Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, p. 455
Ibid., p. 479
Ibid., p. 455
Ibid., 480-481
Ibid., pp. 484-485
Ibid.
For more information, see our article Nepalese Monarchism in 2025: A Brief Timeline
For more information, see our article Cornered and Crumbling: Nepal’s Maoist Regime Under Siege!