Reconsidering the Last Tsar: A Comprehensive Defense of Nicholas II
Historical Judgment and the Burden of Imperial Duty
Introduction
Tsar Nicholas II of Russia has been often described as some inept despot who led Russia to ruin and brought his country to a breaking point which led to the rise of Marxism, yet is this truly the case? Was Tsar Nicholas II truly some great tyrant enforcing feudalism and keeping Russia backwards, or was he simply a monarch misunderstood and greatly slandered?
With the anniversary of the Tsar’s birth being only two days ago, and having witnessed many attacks against the Tsar and defended him in many debates, it seems fitting to write a defense of the Tsar for this occasion. In this article, I intend to go through many of the claims and attacks against the Tsar–both events and broader claims–and debunk or explain them, providing important context or information that shows a much different picture than what is painted by most individuals.
Khodynka Tragedy
The Khodynka Tragedy has not been mentioned quite as much as other events, yet it is best to start at the events chronologically before moving on towards broader claims. The tragedy has been depicted in usual depictions of history as something where the Tsar ignored a horrible tragedy that occurred and instead went to go party, depicted by common sources of history such as Oversimplified¹. Yet this is far from the case! First and foremost the responsibility for the event itself does not lie with the Tsar; the celebration was planned by Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich and his colleagues, who grossly underestimated the size of the crowd². In fact, the tragedy was noted to have occurred due to the panic in the crowd over limited supply, and poor decisions regarding distribution by workers on the ground. To blame the Tsar for such a tragedy is the same as blaming the CEO of a gas station company for a cashier blowing up a station. Tsar Nicholas additionally was very sorrowful about the tragedy despite his lack of responsibility. As noted by Yulia Afanasyenko, “Witte was also sure that if the decision depended only on Nicholas’ will, the tsar would have cancelled all the festive events.” This alone showcases how the Tsar would have rather spent his time mourning the deceased—as noted elsewhere, he wanted to pray for the victims instead of attending the other events—and his later actions showcase his benevolent nature to his people. The Tsar visited the injured in the hospital the day after the tragedy, and as noted by Rusian Ward, “Nicholas decreed that all those affected received a substantial pension from the government. They did, up until the Revolution in 1917. The ‘compassionate’ Bolsheviks wanted nothing to do with the simple people that they supposedly had elected to represent.”³.
And lastly, if one were to blame Nicholas II for appointing Sergei Alexandrovich to plan the festivities, one must consider that the Grand Duke was Nicholas' uncle, and as such had the trust that one holds for family members, especially with the Tsar being a family man as shown by his relationship with his wife and children. Family members are generally given the benefit of the doubt and trust, and on top of that, the Grand Duke was older than Nicholas and more experienced, making him appear even more trustworthy, meaning that the Tsar simply followed human behaviour, rather than intentionally making a bad decision.
The Russo-Japanese War
Sometimes the blame for the war is placed upon the Tsar, I myself have seen neoliberals attempt to lay the blame upon the Tsar and as such it makes sense to debunk this next.
First and foremost it is important to understand the context that Japan and Russia had been both pursuing expansionist foreign policy in the Far East. As shown with the annexation of Taiwan, Japanese expansion—at least early on—had been actively encouraged and abetted by Westerners, with Interim Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi being convinced to take over Taiwan and aided by US Minister DeLong and Foreign Ministry adviser LeGendre⁴. Moreover, Japan had been increasingly expansionist and imperialist leading up to the war, with pro-war factions largely growing internally and driving Japan towards war, with the Japanese Army already having many subscribers to the belief of Hokushin-ron or “Northern Expansion”, which included Russian Siberia.
Additionally, the context of Korea and foreign involvement is imperative to understand in this situation as Korea greatly inflamed tensions between the two powers and Theodore Roosevelt helped fan the flames. With Korea, Japan had slowly been encroaching on the nation and influencing, attempting to force concessions, silence opposition, and overall conduct a slow and subtle takeover. With the increasing influence, Korea’s Empress had attempted to mobilize a resistance against Japan, resulting in her assassination within the Royal Palace. This resulted in the Russian Legation becoming the residence of King Gojong of Korea and his cabinet, showcasing a gradual process of Korea seeking help from Russia against Japanese invasion⁵. And considering both Russian interests in Manchuria and Port Arthur—the latter greatly important to Russia to have a warm water port, and the former for timber and similar industries—the Russians were willing to help protect Korean independence. In fact, Tsar Nicholas II stated on the record that he did not desire to take over Korea, as pointed out by Ko Unoki:
Tsar Nicholas II of Russia did not have, however, territorial designs on Korea per se despite the fact that Russia had significant timber concessions in the Yalu River region of Korea. “I do not want to seize Korea,” he told Prince Henry of Prussia in 1901. On the other hand, he continued, “under no circumstances can I allow Japan to become firmly established there. That would be a casus belli.”⁶
With this, mutually exclusive goals were set by the two powers, with Russia wishing to protect its interests in Manchuria and by extension protect Korean independence, whilst Japan desired to expand into China, Korea, and perhaps Siberia.
American influence played a great part in this buildup to the war as well, particularly with President Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt, Ku Unoki noting that Roosevelt actively encouraged a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in 1904—notably the same year the war began—with Ku Unoki stating:
For the Japanese, however, while Roosevelt’s view of them may have been flattering in certain respects, what was perhaps more in their interest was his endorsement of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for East Asia. He first broached this idea to a Japanese envoy, Kaneko Kentaro and the Japanese Minister to Washington Takahira Kogoro during a private luncheon at the White House in June 1904.
Roosevelt also desired to provide more power to America in the East by playing the two powers against each other, Unoki describes Roosevelt's actions following the brokering of a peace deal by saying, “With this semblance of a balance of power achieved in Manchuria between an exhausted Japan and Russia Roosevelt hoped to see the creation of an open playing field that would allow American political and economic influence to dominate the region.” Essentially through American encouragement and desire to play the two against each other, gasoline had been added to sparks.
Additionally adding to the flames was that of Kaiser Wilhelm II, attempting to ally with Russia repeatedly. In the Kaiser's correspondence and meetings with the Tsar, he repeatedly attempted to encourage Tsar Nicholas towards war with Japan, even making some promises of German support, as noted by historian John Rohl: “Since Nicholas II succeeded to the throne in November 1894 the Kaiser had constantly urged the young Tsar to regard himself as the defender of Christian Europe against the heathen ‘yellow peril’ in East Asia and to rely on the backing of the German Reich in Europe.”
Despite this however, Tsar Nicholas II still tried to prevent a war against Japan, with historian John Rohl noting the skill of Nicholas' Foreign Minister Count Lamsdorff:
Despite Wilhelm’s tireless efforts, in the months following Reval it looked for a time as if the appeasement politicians in St Petersburg and Tokyo would gain the upper hand. Bülow was disappointed to report to the Kaiser on 1 August 1903 that ‘in East Asia the Russians and the Japanese are trying to outdo each other in backing out’. Wilhelm remained convinced that ‘there will be war! In good German, voilà tout!!’, but he did not hide his fury at the Russian attempts to preserve peace and more especially at Lamsdorff’s skilful diplomacy.
Nicholas II was making efforts towards peace, yet this was made difficult and eventually unlikely due to two key factors, those being the Kaiser and the Japanese themselves. As scholar Yōko Katō points out:
The general picture is that the government privately discussed Korea, while the people publicly discussed Manchuria. With such a gap, it is no wonder that the Korean government erred in its observations. Perhaps this is the reason why negotiations between Japan and Russia never reached a satisfactory conclusion.⁸
From this, it can be seen that the general public of Japan stoked the flames of war beyond what was already discussed, with Katō’s article and other previously cited materials showcasing how while the Japanese Government was focused on Korea, the public dragged Manchuria into the equation and forced the Japanese into fighting a war. As for the factor of Kaiser Wilhelm, historian John Rohl points out that:
In Russian court circles it was said that ‘for the Tsar there is only one authority at present: Kaiser Wilhelm. If the Tsar is showing a certain confidence at this difficult time it is thanks to Kaiser Wilhelm. The Tsar is firmly convinced that he can rely on the Kaiser, and therefore also on Germany, whatever the circumstances.
With this, it is important to consider how the Kaiser had repeatedly attempted to derail peace talks between Russia and Japan and encourage the war. With the trust Nicholas held for the Kaiser, combined with the encouragement of Nicholas to fight Japan and make promises of German support, helped to derail peace talks and delay things enough for Japan to decide to declare war.
And lastly for the matter of military performance in the Russo-Japanese War, such cannot entirely be pinned upon the Tsar, as first and foremost the Russian army was suffering morale issues already before the war, thus at a disadvantage at the start of the war⁹. Additionally, the average Russian soldier had to spend around forty days taking an incomplete trans-siberian railway across the entirety of Russia to reach the front, whilst Japan had the convenience of being within easy sailing distance of the frontlines. It is also additionally important to point out that the conditions of the war resembled that of the Western Front of World War One, and it took years of planning and attrition for the ground to be gained under those conditions, so a different standard should not be applied to the Russians expecting them to magically outperform generals of the Great War despite suffering similar conditions with additional hindrances. The Russo-Japanese War was also unprecedented for many in terms of the conditions and tactics, with historical commentators like Potential History pointing out other factors that hindered the Russians such as poor intelligence and an officer staff that was nervous—which is to be expected when Russia had not fought in a war in quite some time¹⁰. The Tsar was thousands of kilometers away from the frontlines, and the decisions regarding the war mostly lay with the general staff and generals of Russia themselves, who were plagued with nervousness, and other issues such as disobedience, such as Anatoly Stessel surrendering Port Arthur to the Japanese without consulting any of his superiors. When attempting to blame the Tsar for such a performance, I'd ask any reader to put themselves in his shoes for a moment—a king has been declared war upon by a nation considered weaker and inferior by most of the world, and while you have not gone through war nor military training, you have a general staff that has all gone through training and military academies, so why would you not entrust the responsibilities of war to them?
Revolution of 1905
The events of Bloody Sunday and the subsequent revolution are often vaguely known. The story is said to be about peaceful protesters marching to deliver a simple petition to the royal palace, calling for simple reforms like an eight-hour workday, before being gunned down by the army¹¹. However, not everything is as black and white as things originally seemed once confronted with context and other important information.
First and foremost, Tsar Nicholas II was not even in St. Petersburg during this march, due to fears for his life following a recent attempt on his life days before the march. Additionally, it is important to consider both the membership of the march, the leadership, and the petition itself. First and foremost, George Gapon—the leader of the march—was a member of the Okhrana who had been switching sides covertly and cooperating with the Socialist Revolutionaries, an organization that also made up many of the individuals in the march¹². This is important to consider as the Socialist Revolutionaries were not some peaceful reformist group, but rather a violent radical organization that actively condoned and conducted terrorism and assassination before Bloody Sunday, and called for village communes nationwide¹³. Upon considering the involvement of the SRs in this march, it begins to make sense why there were security concerns regarding this, yet the motivations of George Gapon seem to point towards ulterior motives of inciting violence when one considers that the police had actively told him that the demonstration would be illegal, and impossible as the Tsar was not in the city, yet went through the demonstration anyways, showcasing irrationality if desiring peace, and rationality if desiring violence.
As for the heavy-handed response of the Russian Army to the march, it is important to consider that as previously stated, the police had already said the march was illegal in advance. It is also important to consider that St. Petersburg’s military commander at the time, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, had said he would enforce order at any cost; and did not care what the cost was for keeping order¹⁴. This was also conducted at a time in which it was more acceptable for governments to be heavy-handed in the name of maintaining order, with historians such as Robin Winks detailing how more democratic leaders such as Clemenceau in France had established virtual dictatorships for the sake of internal stability¹⁵.
Overall the tragedy which was Bloody Sunday lies less with the Tsar, and more towards George Gapon and the Socialist Revolutionaries, with there having been reports of armed demonstrators shattering windows and conducting other acts of property damage and violence before the shots; making the shots seem more like a response to a violent mob approaching the palace which had already been told that their demonstration was illegal, rather than a peaceful and legal assembly being gunned down by the forces of some cold-blooded autocrat, especially considering the remorse the Tsar expressed in his journals, writing:
9th of January. Sunday. A hard day! In Petersburg there was serious unrest due to the workers’ wish to reach the Winter Palace. The troops had to shoot in different parts of the city and there were many killed and wounded. Lord, how painful and hard!¹²
Ultimately, the evidence paints a strikingly different picture from the common narrative, showcasing the military attempting to stop terrorists rather than a peaceful demonstration.
Outbreak of World War One
Whilst most individuals lay blame for the Great War on Austria-Hungary, Germany, or Serbia, rather than Tsar Nicholas, it is still important to point out the efforts made by Tsar Nicholas to avoid such a war from occurring.
Tsar Nicholas and Kaiser Wilhelm had been in correspondence throughout the early 20th century as already made apparent. Through this, the Tsar made multiple efforts to try and maintain peace within Europe and prevent the Great War from occurring. One of the key things to note from this is that Tsar Nicholas made an effort to try and put the July Crisis through diplomatic conventions, attempting to have the case put before the Hague to settle it rather than through force, saying to the Kaiser in a telegram:
Thank you for your telegram, conciliatory and friendly. Meanwhile, the official message transmitted today by your ambassador to my minister was in a completely different tone. I ask you to explain this disagreement. It would be correct to refer the Austro-Serbian question to the Hague Conference). I count on your wisdom and friendship.¹⁶
Later on into the July Crisis, Tsar Nicholas attempted to further prevent war, sending a telegram on August 1st, the very day war was declared, and said:
I received your telegram. Understand you are obliged to mobilise but wish to have the same guarantee from you as I gave you, that these measures do not mean war and that we shall continue negociating for the benefit of our countries and universal peace deal to all our hearts. Our long proved friendship must succeed, with God's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anexiously, full of confidence await your answer.¹⁷
Indeed, the Tsar was quite a peacemaker in his regards, even beyond his attempts to have peace with Japan before the Russo-Japanese War as previously discussed, or his attempts to prevent the Great War during the July Crisis. In fact, the very reason The Hague is known across the world as a center of international justice is the Tsar himself, as his Hague Conferences gave the city the reputation that still stands strong for his day¹⁸. Near the turn of the century, it was the Tsar who had become convinced to de-escalate Europe through talks of peace and reducing the arms races of Europe, and as such called for an international conference for peace¹⁹. It was through Nicholas's desire for peace that Europe saw a chain reaction of conferences after conferences with so many important events that still hold strong today such as the recognition of the Geneva Convention in the sixth convention. Indeed, it is hard to hold a man who strived and worked so hard for peace, as responsible for the Great War.
World War One
It is often the Tsar whom Russia’s poor performance is blamed on, perhaps a relic of the wearied soldiers blaming the Tsar as he was their commander, passed on to the wider public. However, the Tsar cannot be blamed fully for the poor outcomes Russia faced in the war. As associate professor of history at Villanova University and expert on the Russian Revolution, Lynne Hartnett points out:
Things didn’t Improve as the months dragged on,” Hartnett says. “By the end of the year, the Russian empire had lost more than one million men.” Russia’s ammunitions were all but exhausted and the country’s infrastructure was not equipped to efficiently resupply troops.²⁰
The Russian Empire had already been facing military defeat and heavy losses prior to the Tsar taking command of the military and was in a rough state. In an effort to boost the morale of Russia and improve the situation, he took command as a symbolic move. As an experienced researcher of the Tsar, Paul Gilbert points out, this move was greatly symbolic, mostly encompassing visits to hospitals and such, however, this did not leave the Tsar uninvolved with military affairs beyond being a symbolic figure²¹. As historian George Mikhailovich Katkov points out in Paul Gilbert’s article on the matter:
According to Russian historian George Mikhailovich Katkov (1903-1985): “Alexeev was a modest and reserved man, an educated general, to whom the Tsar treated extremely attentively . . . . Every morning the Tsar and Alexeev discussed the affairs of the front for several hours. They apparently understood each other well, and there is no indication that the Emperor tried to impose any strategic or tactical ideas on his Chief of Staff. In fact, Alexeev was the commander-in-chief, and each of his undertakings was supported by the Sovereign.”²¹
From this, it becomes quite clear that the Tsar left the strategic and tactical decisions to his General Staff, a decision that is usually sound in warfare, a decision that Kaiser Wilhelm II had made in Germany, to the point of Germany essentially becoming a military dictatorship by 1916, with Germany having many military victories in the war under such policy²². With this decision, the only fault of Nicholas to do such was that it resulted in defeats becoming associated with him rather than other individuals²³.
Rather than the Tsar being responsible for the horrible losses, it comes down to the situation Russia entered the war in. Economically Russia was dependent on foreign investment as it was in a period of rapid growth and industrialization, while its primary foe Germany was a well-industrialized power already²⁴. Simply put, Russia didn't have the industrial capability to supply her army in the war, and its railways were insufficient to supply everything, as whilst Russia had sufficient food production to feed her population during the war, distribution and transportation often had issues that caused shortages, particularly in urban centers²⁰. Throughout the war, a combination of poor maintenance and enormous burdens of wartime needs caused 30% of Russia's railway stock to be unusable by 1916. Additionally, the Russians were plagued with incompetency among generals and officers, most notable in the Tannenberg Offensive in which generals refused to communicate with each other and officers transmitted without any encryption.
That is not to say that Tsar Nicholas only hired incompetent individuals or did not recognize talent. In fact, Tsar Nicholas showcased a recognition of talent in the appointment of Mikhail Alekseev as Chief of Staff during the war, with many Russian generals of the Great War going on to note Alekseev later on as one of Russia’s most competent commanders, with Admiral Kolchak describing him as “[T]he most outstanding of our generals, the most educated, the most intelligent, the most prepared for broad military tasks.” These claims were only proven empirically by his successes such as his orderly evacuation in the Great Retreat as commander of the Northwestern Front, or his resounding victory in the Battle of Galicia—a loss that Austria-Hungary took years to recover from—as Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front. Additionally, there were more competent individuals in the Russian Military who served Russia, such as Aleksey Brusilov, a man who had secured many great victories such as the famous Brusilov Offensive. And there was of course General Nikolai Yudenich, effectively the commander of Russian forces in the Caucuses, he led an extremely effective fighting force against the Ottomans, going on the offensive even when the Ottomans turned their full attention to the Russians, securing the key city of Erzurum and receiving a St. George Star from the Tsar for his victory²⁵.
Ultimately, the Tsar cannot be blamed for the poor wartime performance of Russia, and in fact, it could be said that his successors in the Provisional Government or Red Army were greater failures, with the Provisional Government firing many competent commanders over political reasons, and both successors seeing many horrible defeats to even minor powers such as Poland.
The Revolutions of 1917
Often the blame for these revolutions is placed upon the Tsar as a whole for the alleged poor performance as a leader. However, as discussed, the major factor for the revolution—that being the war—largely turned out poorly due to other factors rather than directly from the Tsar, already separating him greatly from the blame of the revolution.
With regards to the Russian Revolution, firsthand accounts close to the Imperial Family such as the book of Pierre Gilliard—a French tutor to the Tsar’s children—13 Years at the Russian Court prove indispensable in dispelling rumors and misconceptions about the Russian Revolution. As Pierre Gilliard goes on to describe the Revolution, he points out German involvement in causing the revolution, saying:
The Germans were the only people in Europe who knew Russia. Their knowledge of it was fuller and more exact than that of the Russians themselves. They had known for a long time that the Tsarist regime, with all its faults, was the only one capable of prolonging the Russian resistance, They knew that with the fall of the Tsar Russia would be at their mercy. They stopped at nothing to procure his fall. That is why the preservation of the existing system should have been secured at any cost. The revolution was inevitable at that moment, it was said. It could only be averted by the immediate grant of a constitution. And so on! The fact is that the perverse fate which had blinded the sovereigns was to blind the nation in turn.²⁶
From such a passage, German involvement in creating the Russian Revolution begins to rear its head, however, to a skeptic believing it to simply be the scapegoating of an apologist, I would say that when confronted with evidence it is solidified to be more truthful than a mere wishful apologia. First and foremost is the well-known event of Germany sending Lenin and other revolutionaries on a train car to Russia; however, there exists also millions spent by Germany on subverting the people through the spread of revolutionary propaganda, and millions more spent on arming revolutionaries with dynamite and weapons²⁷, making it clear that Germany had a major involvement in the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. Additionally one must consider the situation that Tsar Nicholas was in, as Pierre Gilliard goes on to describe the situation politically amongst Russians:
The position of the Tsar was extraordinarily difficult. To the Extremists of the Right, who regarded a compromise with Germany as their only road to salvation, he was the insurmountable obstacle, who had to make way for another sovereign. To the Extremists of the Left who desired victory, but a victory without a Tsar, he was the obstacle which the revolution would remove. And while the latter were endeavouring to undermine the foundations of the monarchy by intensive propaganda at and behind the front-thus playing Germany's game - the moderate parties adopted that most dangerous and yet characteristically Russian course of doing nothing. They were victims of that Slav fatalism which means waiting on events and hoping that some providential force will come and guide them for the public good. They confined themselves to passive resistance because they failed to realise that in so acting they were paralysing the nation.
With this, it is clear to see that Russia was suffering politically as the radicals closed in whilst moderates sat back and let the chaos ensue. With the dormancy of the moderates, the Tsar was forced into a situation where there was little to protect him, with an army wearied by war and with generals cooperating with parliamentary politicians over the Tsar as historian Richard Pipes points out. Furthermore, Richard Pipes shows that there existed widespread revolutionary sentiments for syndicalism and communal ownership of land across the factory and rural population, alongside an intelligentsia that was extremely revolutionary and wanted nothing more than the destruction of the Monarchy²⁸. However, despite this situation, Russia was not entirely against the Tsar; as despite popular belief the Russian Revolution was far from a popular uprising against the government. The Tsar was still rather popular and considered by many to possess the divine right to rule across Russia, with Monarchist sentiments still lingering throughout Russia. Richard Pipes goes on to describe the sentiments held in Russia by saying:
Deep in their hearts, the Court, the bureaucracy, and the professional officer corps were permeated with a patrimonial spirit that viewed Russia as the tsar's private domain. Although in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Muscovite patrimonial institutions were gradually dismantled, the mentality survived. And not only in official circles: the peasantry too, thought in patrimonial terms, believing in strong, unlimited authority and regarding the land as tsarist property.²⁸
Additionally, this is a sentiment documented not only by historians looking back on the event, but by those who were on the ground and lived during Tsarist Russia such as Pierre Gilliard, who went on to describe the religious notions of Tsarism that many Russians held nationwide:
It was forgotten that Russia did not consist merely of fifteen to twenty million human beings ripe for parliamentary government, but that it had one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty million peasants, most of them rude and uneducated, to whom the Tsar was still the Lord's Anointed, he whom God had chosen to direct the destinies of Great Russia. Accustomed from his earliest youth to hear the priest invoke the name of the Tsar in the offertory, one of the most solemn moments in the Orthodox liturgy, the moujik in his mystical exaltation was bound to attribute to him a character semidivine.(Is not this idea illustrated in the popular saying which betrays the simple faith of the Russian peasant and his feeling of impotence: "God is a very long way up; the Tsar a very long way off.")
The Tsar was not the head of the Russian Church. He was its protector and defender. But after Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate the people were inclined to regard him as the incarnation of both spiritual and temporal authority. It was an error, of course, but it survived. It was this double aspect of the person of the sovereign which made Tsarism mean so much to the masses, and as the Russian people are essentially mystic, the second factor was not a whit less important than the first. For in the mind of the moujik, autocracy could not be separated from Orthodoxy.²⁶
From these two excerpts, it becomes clear how much support the Tsar truly held amongst the people, and with historians such as Richard Pipes describing how the intelligentsia was able to pretend to be the spokespersons of the masses which showcases how this revolution was not some popular uprising, more akin to a coup d’etat which involved a few angry mobs of workers. Indeed, if this was truly some revolutionary popular uprising, then Lenin would have had no need to disband the constituent assembly as he did, with historians like John Simkin pointing out that “Lenin had no doubt that if the elected parliament survived, his imposed regime would not. He had riot expected to win a majority and never had any intention of allowing such a democratic institution to sink roots. Already unsure of the allegiance of locally based troops, he had imported a division of Lettish sharpshooters as military insurance.”²⁹
Ultimately it is clear, that this revolution was not one of popular support for the removal of a Tsar, but rather a beloved Tsar removed by a small minority backed by foreign powers to undermine a war effort, I believe it best to end this section with another excerpt for Pierre Gilliard, explaining some of the reasoning behind Tsar Nicholas II being determined to remain in power and continue his reign:
Yet the Tsar was inspired by two dominant sentiments - his political enemies themselves knew it - to which all Russia could rally. One of them was his love for his country and the other his absolute determination to continue the war to the bitter end. In the universal blindness which was the result of party passion men did not realise that, in spite of all, a Tsar pledged to the cause of victory was an immense moral asset for the Russian people. They did not see that a Tsar who was what he was popularly supposed to be could alone lead the country to victory and save it from bondage to Germany.²⁶
Truly, the Tsar was a patriot, beloved by his subjects rather than hated.
Broader Claims regarding Reign
Backwards Feudalism
A common myth espoused against the Tsar was the myth that the Russian Empire was a backward society still clinging to feudalism, centuries behind the West in many imaginable ways³⁰. This is perhaps the most damning myth spread against Tsarism and the Tsars to discredit their reign, a relic of Soviet propaganda living on. However, this claim is far from the truth, as when confronted with the evidence it becomes clear that Russia was rapidly rising and soon to meet the rest of the world in many areas.
When it comes to the idea that Russia was stuck in agrarian ways and refusing to industrialize, we must first consider Russia prior to Tsar Nicholas II. In An Economic History of the USSR 1917-1991 by Professor Alexander Nove—considered to one of the most significant scholars on the Soviet Union³¹—we are given a great picture of the grim state that Russia was originally in, looking at the mid-nineteenth century. As Nove points out:
Russia in 1854 faced the Western powers with an obsolete social organization and obsolete weapons. Society was still dominated by an inflexible caste system, and most of the peasants were serfs owned by the landed proprietors, the State or the Crown. Industry had languished since 1800. At this date Russian output of metal had been equal to Britain's; by 1854 she had fallen very far behind. The only railway of importance that had been completed ran from St Petersburg to Moscow, with a line to Warsaw under construction. The Russian army in the Crimea had to be supplied by horse and cart on dirt tracks; this army consisted of serfs serving virtually for life, and was poorly armed and equipped. The fleet had no steamboats and could only be sunk to block the entrance to Sevastopol. The military failure in the Crimea was a great shock to Tsar and society alike.³²
Russia was very much in a sorry state whilst the rest of Europe had been on the rise thanks to the Industrial Revolution and the development of infrastructure, however, this quickly began to change for Russians with Tsar Nicholas II’s reign, through the appointment of officials such as Sergei Witte and Pyotr Stolypin, who quickly began to bring about outstanding improvements for Russia.
With the matter of literacy, nations such as Britain had a head start, going from roughly half of the nation being able to read and write by the mid-nineteenth century, to reaching nearly the entire nation by the turn of the century³³. However, even during the late nineteenth century, Russia was not a backward society of illiteracy, as Nove points out “In the 1897 census, it was found that, in European Russia, 35.8 per cent of the men and 12.4 per cent of women were literate.” Thanks to the works of Tsar Nicholas however, this began to rapidly take off, as historian Paul Gilbert points out in detail. Tsar Nicholas II devoted roughly 4% of the state budget towards expanding literacy and education in the nation during the 1890s—later doubling by 1914—and the results rapidly began to show themselves in under twenty years, as by 1913-1914, Russia was publishing just as many books as other Western nations, held a literacy rate of 40%, and hundreds of thousands engaged in education beyond elementary through technical schools and universities³⁴. Universal Primary Education was being delivered to Russia by the Tsar and was quickly yielding results as Russia was holding a 2% annual increase in literacy, which would’ve meant that just at current levels—not even considering additional investments he might have made had his reign continued—illiteracy in the entirety of Russia would have ended in thirty years, something which the Soviets themselves accomplished ten years later in the 1950s³⁵. Ultimately this showcases the skillful leadership of Tsar Nicholas II in bringing literacy to Russia and advancing Russia.
As for industrial and infrastructural progress, the Tsar with Witte and Stolypin managed to rapidly industrialize Russia and bring it forward immensely. As Alexander Nove pointed out:
For example, in the decade 1891-1900 industrial production more than doubled, and, in particular, there was a very marked advance in heavy industry. This was the consequence of the protective tariffs introduced in 1891, and of the deliberate policy followed in subsequent years by Count Witte, who became Minister of Finance. The output of pig iron in Russia trebled during the decade, while production in Germany increased in these same years by only 1.6. Output of oil during this decade kept pace with that of the United States, and in fact in 1900 Russia's oil production was the highest in the world, being slightly ahead of America's. The same decade saw a great railway boom, with the total track mileage increasing by 73.5 per cent. However, an economic crisis led to a slowdown of growth in the years 1900-1905 and again in the period 1907-9. This particularly affected manufacture of iron and steel, and it was not until 1910 that the output of pig iron surpassed the 1900 level. From then until the outbreak of war there was another sharp upswing in industrial production. A Soviet textbook, which is not likely to overstate the achievements of Tsarism, has put forward the following estimates: during the period 1860-1910 the world's industrial production increased by six, Great Britain's by 2.5, Germany's by six and Russia's by 10.5.
From these advancements alone it becomes clear the level of industrial progress and infrastructure growth was rapidly rising under Tsar Nicholas II. However such progress was further seen through the rapid transformation of the banking system and capital overall in Russia when looking at their late nineteenth-century banking and comparing it to the progress achieved in simply a few decades by the Tsar, as pointed out later on by Alexander Nove:
The progress of Russian industrialization suffered from relative shortage of capital, as well as from a poorly developed banking system and a generally low standard of commercial morality. The traditional Muscovite merchants, rich and uneducated, were far from being the prototypes of a modern commercial capitalism. The situation changed towards the end of the nineteenth century, and particularly during the rapid industrialization which characterized the nineties. There was a marked growth of both Russian and foreign capital, and an equal improvement in the banking system. Russian entrepreneurs of a modern type began more and more to emerge. Under cover of the protective tariff of 1891, and with the establishment of a stabilized rouble based on the gold standard, foreign capital received every encouragement. This was particularly the work of Count Witte, who exercised a dominant influence over Russian financial and commercial policy at this time.
From this the massive transformation of Russia's banking system is clear, seeming to change from something resembling the feudal era and transformed by the Tsar and his ministers into something resembling the modern era in a few decades, something which took seven centuries following the fall of the Western Roman Empire to develop organically in Europe through cities like Venice and Genoa or organizations like the Knights Templar³⁶. Coinciding with this massive overhaul and Witte making the economy friendly to investment, the Russian Empire witnessed a plethora of French investment, with some figures estimating that the growth of foreign capital was increasing in Russia so much it outpaced domestic capital—which itself made significant growth for the time. Additionally, this foreign capital was crucial according to the provided data by Alexander Nove, estimating that foreign capital provided about 42 percent of the capital in the metal goods industries, 28 percent in textiles, 50 percent in chemicals, and 37 percent in woodworking, showcasing their importance in Russia's industrialization.
Additionally, there exists the matter of agriculture, a sector which composed most of the population who were still largely peasants owned by village communes. Tsar Nicholas II and his minister of Pyotr Stolypin worked effectively to free many of these peasants from the commune and give birth to a growing middle class within Russia. As described by Nove, the Stolypin reforms went as follows:
Outstanding redemption dues, which had been reduced, were finally abolished. Peasants were now free to leave their communities, to consolidate their holdings as their property, to buy land or to sell it, to move to town or to migrate. Stolypin's object was to encourage the emergence of a class of peasant proprietors who would be prosperous, efficient and politically loyal. This was the so-called 'wager on the strong'. Many go-ahead peasants took advantage of the new opportunities. By 1916 about 2 million households had left the communities and set up private farms, out of 2.7 million who had expressed their desire to do so. This represented some 24 per cent of the households in forty affected provinces of European Russia. Some remained in the villages, others erected farm houses, so-called khutora, outside.
This was a major development for Russia as millions had been freed from communal ownership and were enabled to embrace private ownership of land, leading to vast improvements in productivity and income. As Nove points out, “Commercial agriculture, conducted both by the progressive landlords and by the more prosperous peasants, was already developing in some areas even before this reform. It naturally speeded up thereafter.” With a modest understanding of economics, one can understand the consistency of superior performance of private commercial industry over communal industry, as shown by figures from the Soviet Union where private industry produced a majority of the agricultural produce such as eggs and meat in the Union despite making up only 3% of the total agricultural sector³⁷. Such growth was noticeable very quickly as pointed out by Nove once more when discussing the growth of agriculture, he states:
Agricultural production rose rapidly in the first years of the century, due partly to favourable weather conditions and partly to the effects of the reform and of better methods. While most peasants were still using outdated methods, including large numbers of wooden ploughs, the more progressive sectors were now beginning to use modern equipment. This process was greatly assisted by a sharp rise in agricultural prices, due in part to a rise in world prices. According to Lyashchenko the net income of agriculture increased by 88.6 per cent in the period 1900-13, representing an increased output in constant prices of 33.8 per cent. The spread of commercialism and of capitalist relations was speeding up. Exports of grain rose very sharply. Thus in the years 1911-13 they were 50 per cent higher than in the years 1901-5, on average. Exports of butter, eggs, flax and other agricultural products were also increasing. A protective tariff encouraged the development of cotton-growing in Central Asia.
From such growth in production alongside the growth of capitalism it is clear the vestiges of feudalism were being phased out in favour of markets and capital, not to mention the massive freedoms granted to peasantry through the Tsar and Stolypin in his reforms which freed millions from communes, alongside abolishing the redemption dues which had largely kept the freed serfs and their descendants stuck economically through high taxation.
Ultimately through all of this progress, calculations of millions of calories produced per male agricultural worker in Russia surpassed those in Spain, Italy, or Japan in 1910, showcasing the improvements in Russia. If Tsar Nicholas II's Russia was truly some feudalist society, there would have been no such advancement in society and the massive economic growth that occurred.
“Tsar Nicholas was a Tyrant”
Often Tsar Nicholas II is accused of being a tyrannical ruler as well, oppressing the population and controlling them with a tight fist. I have heard this before when debating over the Tsar myself. However, this is not exactly the case when this belief is confronted with the evidence.
First and foremost one must look to definitions, as tyranny is a subject that can often become very emotionally charged and distorted into being heavily subjective in definition. For simplicity, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary shall be utilized for this, defining tyranny as:
1
a: an absolute ruler unrestrained by law or constitution
b: a usurper of sovereignty
2
a: a ruler who exercises absolute power oppressively or brutally
b: one resembling an oppressive ruler in the harsh use of authority or power³⁸
With definitions established, it is now time to explain why the Tsar was not a tyrant. With the matter of the first definition, that being an absolute ruler unrestrained by law or constitution. Despite this, one must consider that this definition quickly falls flat as the rule of law and order still existed in Russia, and rational limits on what the Tsar could and couldn't do, with even critics of Tsarism pointing out the monarchy was still limited by officials such as the nobility³⁹. Absolute Monarchy itself is not tyranny automatically, as it would take more than simply wielding power to make one a tyrant, but rather actively conducting oppression and similar acts which will be discussed in a moment. As for the definition of usurping sovereignty, the Tsar is far from being able to accomplish this, as he is the Sovereign and cannot usurp himself.
As for the matter of oppression, as outlined by the secondary definition, this attack falls to pieces when confronted by the evidence. First and foremost with perhaps the most damning evidence which could be presented against the Tsar—the exiling of prisoners to Siberia—one must consider the context of the time and additionally who got exiled and for what, alongside comparing prison practices to other places and successors. With exile to Siberia, one must consider that such a sentence was not a death sentence and opposition was still able to operate freely within Siberia for the most part, with even more casual historians such as Oversimplified admitting that exiles such as Lenin were able to freely write revolutionary material and publish it, alongside Lenin being able to leave Siberia after his sentence was complete and move elsewhere such Switzerland⁴⁰. Additionally, with Siberian exile, there were plenty of cases of journalists able to visit Siberian exiles and take their photographs, even able to interact with them enough to do things such as acquire their attire and so forth as demonstrated by American journalists⁴¹. Additionally, Siberian exile was not some horrifying punishment compared to the common association one might have with the socialist version of it—the Gulag—on the contrary, the Tsarist form of exiles worked much differently in which criminals who weren't violent maniacs were able to live in towns and essentially live out normal lives with a few travel restrictions in the name of ensuring continued stability in society, like how the Decembrists settled Siberian towns when exiled and were able to live out normal lives as pointed out by authors such as Daniel Beer⁴¹. Additionally one must consider that such actions—forcing someone to remain in a singular area, justified by the label of public safety or security—are not a relic of the past, but rather continue to operate today with modern examples such as COVID restrictions imposed by democratic governments or requiring someone on bail to remain in the area until their trial. Furthermore, those who went to actual prison centers in Siberia rather than merely being exiled to live in Siberian towns for a few years endured conditions much more favourable than many other prisons around the world, receiving additional food from the populace that kept them healthy, alongside being well-fed by the authorities (as pointed out by Beer), all the while having one of the lowest prison mortality rates in all of Europe at a meager 6% despite being in Siberia, a great contrast to Russia's modern prison system having one of the highest rates of mortality in all of Europe, with one of the leading causes being suicide⁴³. And lastly one must consider the context of the situation concerning the political violence that Russia had been facing, with the Socialist Revolutionaries conducting terrorism across the nation, successfully killing Romanovs, Ministers, and countless others across Russia, with this group only being a portion of the agitators⁴⁴. With so many agitators, it was the response of Russians to employ harsh measures of exile to try and maintain order and the rule of law in society, which in itself was not exclusive to an autocracy such as Russia. A great example of such lies in the assassination of President McKinley by anarchists in the United States of America, and the subsequent persecution of anarchism including an immigration ban preventing any anarchist from entering America⁴⁵. When confronted with this context it becomes clear that the actions of the Tsarist were not an abnormality but simply a normal action of the time by various governments, which could even be considered to still be in effect today in some democratic states, such as Edward Snowden being effectively exiled by America due to his passport suspension⁴⁶, Guantanamo Bay acting essentially as a penal colony⁴⁷, or Haida Gwaii effectively exiling members of the community from the island for crimes such as drug dealing⁴⁸.
However, while all seems put to rest on this matter there is one thing that must be addressed, the Okhrana, the secret police of Tsarist Russia, as having a secret police alone seems bad for the image of any leader and appears tyrannical. However one must look at the activities of the Okhrana to understand how they operated less like a weapon of terror like the NKVD or Gestapo, and more like an organization simply working to maintain stability. For starters, the Okhrana’s activities seemed to primarily be the infiltration of socialist groups across Russia, as From The Okhrana To The KGB by Christopher Andrew shows us, they largely infiltrated revolutionary diaspora and domestic groups like the Bolsheviks⁴⁹, akin to the modern CIA infiltrating a terrorist cell, or the FBI—or even local police units—sending their agents undercover into domestic organizations⁵⁰. Additionally, the Okhrana engaged in more than simply exiling and infiltration, as with one of its administrators Zubatov, the Okhrana also began supporting workers' unions and workers' rights, essentially engaging in state welfare through police, described by some as “Police Socialism”. Historian Ronald Hingley goes on to describe Zubatov’s program of trade unions and Police Socialism through the following excerpts, which while lengthy, explain the unions and their effects on the workers well:
Zubatov’s main innovation was, rather, Police Socialism—the organisation of trade unions under Okhrana control.
A period of rapid economic development in Russia of the 1890s had been accompanied by a steep increase in industrial unrest among factory workers—still a proportionately small
community of some three million, but fast growing and finding a new sense of solidarity. Towards the end of the century many strikes broke out, provoked by harsh labour conditions which factory legislation had done little to ease.
Believing the workers to be more concerned with materialconditions than with changing the Empire’s political structure, Zubatov championed their economic interests. He thus hoped to detach them from revolutionary agitators pursuing political aims—for with shorter hours and better pay a worker could surely be as happy under an autocracy as under a revolutionary republic. The workers seemed to agree, flocking to join the Moscow Mechanical Production Workers’ Mutual Aid Society—Zubatov’s first police-controlled trade union, established in May 1901. In this enterprise Zubatov was backed by two superiors, the Grand Duke Sergey Aleksandrovich and D. F. Trepov—Moscow’s Governor-General and Chief of Police respectively. So popular was the new alliance between labour and authority that fifty thousand workers joined a procession led by the Governor-General and marched to Alexander II’s monument in the Kremlin on 19 February 1902 in memory of the serfs’ emancipation decreed forty-one years earlier by the Tsar-Liberator.
[...]
Zubatovite trade unions—resembling the Moscow Mutual Aid Society and similarly based on Police Socialism—were founded in the capital and southern Russia, where Zubatovite aims included equal rights for Jewish workers. Thus was created a far-flung organisation wherein Tsar, Tsarist police and loyalist workers seemed united in a scheme to extort concessions from a common enemy—the industrial employers. There were instances when labourers suffered injury at work, but could not obtain compensation until Zubatov’s police intervened, compelling the employers to pay substantial sums. Such episodes naturally made Zubatovite Socialism popular, but involved interventions by the police in industrial relations already chaotic and caused friction with other government departments.⁵¹
From all of the evidence, it quickly becomes clear that the Okhrana was not the simple totalitarian secret police they may be assumed to have been, but rather a police organization that engaged in various methods of maintaining stability.
And lastly, one must consider one last thing. A tyrant by nature would seek to increase their control on society, and as such would wish to increase the control over people's movement and livelihoods. However Tsar Nicholas II did the exact opposite, with the aforementioned freeing of peasants from their communes, he gave more liberty and independence to the people, the opposite of tyranny. Ultimately, it is clear that Tsar Nicholas II was not a tyrant.
The Tsar’s Anti-Democratic Stance
Oftentimes the Tsar is attacked for his more Conservative stance of sticking towards absolutism rather than allowing the gradual liberalization and rise of Democracy as in Britain. However from a Monarchist point of view, one must truly ask if this was a bad thing, was it truly wrong for a Monarch to refuse to allow the rise of Democracy in his nation? However, the Tsar’s stance still held weight beyond viewing the events from a Monarchist perspective.
The first thing to consider is the players whom the Tsar was dealing with during his reign. The Tsar was dealing with many factions politically however the major ones were of course the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party—later the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks—alongside the Kadets and Socialist Revolutionaries. As shown by the Constituent Assembly, the Socialist Revolutionaries held the majority of the votes if one were to open the door to Liberal Democracy and allow for universal suffrage as many revolutionaries called for⁵². However, the Socialist Revolutionaries could not be worked with, they had actively been engaging in terrorism across Russia and assassinations left and right, to attempt and cooperate with such a group would be akin to attempting to cooperate with modern-day terrorists who desire the destruction of The West such as Al Qaeda and expect a peaceful outcome for both parties. As for the Social Democratic League, the Mensheviks barely held any support, as shown by their minimal standing in the Constituent Assembly. Additionally, the Mensheviks were not exactly an organization that could be cooperated with for the long term, as they were firm believers in the Marxist theory of a “bourgeois-democratic revolution”, which as the name suggests would imply an armed uprising against perceived remnants of feudalism to “pave the way for capitalism”, which by all means could easily include The Tsar⁵³. Additionally, by 1906 with the formation of the Duma, the Mensheviks had already reunited with Lenin and the Bolsheviks, with the Bolsheviks being impossible to cooperate with for obvious reasons.
With the inability to cooperate with either the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party nor Socialist Revolutionaries leaves the last viable party to cooperate with being the Kadets, otherwise known as the Constitutional Democratic Party. However, through The Debate Between Miliukov and Maklakov on the Chances for Russian Liberalism by Antony Kröner, we see the inability to cooperate with the Kadets either⁵⁴. As Kröner points out, the Kadets only had massive support in the first election, mainly due to the boycott of elections by socialists, soon afterwards their support “narrowed down to their basic bulwark of support: the liberal bourgeoisie, that is, the professional middle classes, the well-to-do intelligentsia and the enlightened gentry; the Kadets totally lacked, however, support among workers and peasants.” With this situation, the viability of working with the Kadets seems bleak, as once universal suffrage and democratization is established, they would struggle to have the support needed to remain in the Duma. Additionally, the Kadets failed to have a stable position even internally as well, with their founder and leader—Miliukov—having a hard time keeping his position due to having to repeatedly compromise between the left and right wings of his party, increasingly radical and thus increasingly unable to compromise. Additionally, the Kadets increasingly put themselves at odds with the government through their refusal to condemn violence and terrorism against the government—with Miliukov even making statements about being positive or “cheery” regarding violent acts against the regime—alongside the uncompromising positions of Miliukov when dealing with the regime. When the Tsar attempted to form a new cabinet in 1906, the Tsar attempted to form a coalition cabinet made partially of skilled appointees and partially of Duma representatives, however, Miliukov completely disrupted and prevented the plans, uncompromising on his position that all cabinet members had to not only be Duma representatives, but had to Kadets; showcasing a heavy streak of partisanship. Looking at all this information, it becomes clear that the Tsar lacked good options on parties to cooperate with, and the only reliable options that did not desire a reduction in his power or lean towards violent acts against the regime remained those in favour of his continued autocracy, making the continuation of autocracy the natural result.
Rasputin
Grigori Rasputin is perhaps one of the most common attacks against the Romanov Dynasty, claiming that the Tsar and his family were greatly influenced and manipulated by Rasputin, being under his thumb as he conducted constant degeneracy and debauchery. However, when confronted with historical evidence, and the context of the situation for Rasputin's continued presence with the Romanovs, it becomes quite this is far from the case.
When it comes to claims against Rasputin, there exist many myths about him, be it being in an affair with the Tsarina, regularly conducting debauchery such as public exposure and so forth. However, most of these claims do not come from genuine sources but were rather spread from sources who were not even present to witness such events, as Paul Gilbert describes in an interview (specifically between the timestamps of 25:30 and 30:00), most of the accusations against Rasputin were made by individuals afterwards who were never even present⁵⁵. Additionally, accusations also were fueled by gossip, revolutionary or foreign propaganda, and so forth, as put by Paul Gilbert in one of his many articles:
Malicious gossip and revolutionary propaganda, helped to turn the people against their Tsar. Lies spread like wildfire during the war years. References were made to the “bloody tsarist regime”. Emperor Nicholas II was referred to as “an alcoholic”, and his wife as “a German spy”, as well as the “destructive influence of Grigory Rasputin”. References to the “bloody tsarist regime”, were published daily by the liberal press, often prompted by Western propaganda. German planes dropped leaflets with cynical cartoons of Nikolashka in the trenches of Russian soldiers.⁵⁶
With all of this misinformation, combined with the Soviets closing off many records about the Romanovs to even Soviet Historians until the Soviet Union's dissolution, it is no wonder these myths have managed to persist so much; especially with psychological aspects such confirmation bias being able to further perpetuate these myths, as people are more willing to accept information confirming their beliefs, which would include Historians accepting information from the memoirs of nobles who hated Rasputin. When it comes to actual information about his sexual escapades, it is less of a man exposing himself regularly, engaging in many orgies and more, and rather a man who seemed to have made many visits to brothels according to police reports, alongside sleeping with followers who reportedly threw themselves at him⁵⁷. Additionally, it was falsified information that Rasputin was a lover of the Tsarina, with even mainstream outlets such as Sky History (Yes, the very same ones who make outlandish things such as Ancient Aliens) admitting that the Tsarina and Rasputin had a purely platonic relationship, with letters showcasing a strong a passionate marriage between the Tsar and Tsarina; with the rumours of an affair simply being a smear campaign by the press, much like modern tabloids making up information for sales⁵⁸. With regards to this smearing, even revolutionaries who worked in Socialist organizations and the Provisional Government such as Sergei Petrovich Melgunov admit to having exaggerated greatly, saying “Undoubtedly, the idea of the completely exclusive political influence of the “Friend” [Rasputin] is also greatly exaggerated.”⁵⁹ As for the healing of Alexei Romanov, the myth around it being mystical powers is obviously false; however, Rasputin did in fact heal Alexei Romanov, in that he saved his life by keeping Alexei from medical practitioners, preventing him from taking aspirin, which is extremely important for hemophiliacs to avoid, and allowed with Alexei to recuperate and heal⁶⁰. Additionally, Rasputin's presence likely helped calm both the Tsarina and Alexei, which is important for health, especially with cardiovascular health; with all of this likely aided by the placebo effect—as evidence suggests the Romanovs believed in Rasputin's ability to heal—with even institutions such as Harvard admitting that “a placebo can be just as effective as traditional treatment."⁶¹ With regards to the influence of Rasputin over actual political decisions or Tsar Nicholas II, most of the previously cited sources for this section already explain that Rasputin was at most able to advise, only really holding weight with regards to religious matters, with Paul Gilbert explaining in his interview that Tsar had “put Rasputin in his place” on occasion, and one of his articles details how the Tsar ignored letters from Rasputin regarding foreign policy, such as advisement against the Great War⁶².
With all of this, one must not hold it against the Romanovs for having close ties to Rasputin, as one must try to contextualize and place themselves in the shoes of the Tsarina. The Tsarina had to live with the immense guilt that she had passed on hemophilia to his son, with a priest having to be called to give last rights to Alexei on many occasions. To be a parent is already an arduous task, but to be a parent and watch one's child slowly die despite constantly seeing some of the best doctors in the nation is tortuous for any loving parent. If one were to calm along and seemingly solve these issues with his presence, allowing the child to heal and make recoveries, one would greatly desire to keep this individual around to keep their child alive. And with that context, the presence of Rasputin makes perfect sense.
Conclusion
Ultimately, it is clear that Tsar Nicholas II was a good monarch who was ultimately a great leader for Russia and was simply doing the best he could in troubling times where it seemed as though opposition was everywhere. The Tsar overall is a complex figure, and while this article seeks to do his legacy justice, there is still so much that was not included; such as the Tsar's great care for his soldiers by field testing the equipment himself⁶³, him and his family regularly working towards helping their fellow man such as his daughters working in military hospitals⁶⁴, or NBER working papers determining Stalin to have been a net negative, with a continuation of the Tsar to have been economically superior⁶⁵. Ultimately, I hope that this article has at the very least redeemed the Tsar and his legacy to the reader, and encourage further reading on the Tsar through works such as the excellent and tireless research of Paul Gilbert which can be at https://tsarnicholas.org/. I thank the reader for their time, and bid thee adieu until my next article.
Citations
¹ Oversimplified. “The Russian Revolution - Oversimplified (Part One)” YouTube video, 6:00. August 17th, 2020.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cqbleas1mmo
² https://www.rbth.com/history/332466-khodynka-tragedy-coronation
⁴ https://www.athensjournals.gr/history/2018-4-4-4-Mavropoulos.pdf
⁶ Unoki, Ko. International Relations and the origins of the Pacific War. Basingstoke, New Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. pp. 61-62
⁷ Rohl, John CG, and Roy Bridge. Wilhelm II: Into the abyss of war and exile, 1900 1941. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
⁸ What Caused the Russo-Japanese War—Korea or Manchuria? By Yōko Katō
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30209685
⁹ Jukes, Geoffrey. The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2014.
¹⁰ Potential History. “The Russo-Japanese War” YouTube video, 2:00. January 25th, 2019
¹¹ https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/January-22/bloody-sunday-massacre-in-russia
¹² https://tsarnicholas.org/2020/10/21/bloody-sunday-1905-what-is-the-truth/
¹³ https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSsrp.htm
¹⁴ https://www.romanovs.eu/painful-points
¹⁵ Winks, Robin W., Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher, and Robert Lee Wolff. A History of Civilization: Prehistory to the Present. 8th ed. Vol. The Combined. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
¹⁶ https://militera.lib.ru/memo/french/paleologue/12.html
¹⁷ https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Willy-Nicky_Telegrams
¹⁸ “It can certainly be concluded that the First Hague Peace Conference launched The Hague as International City of Peace and Justice.”
¹⁹ Tryon, James L. “The Hague Conferences.” The Yale Law Journal 20, no. 6 (1911): 470–85. https://doi.org/10.2307/784505
²⁰ https://www.history.com/articles/world-war-i-russian-revolution
²¹ https://tsarnicholas.org/2023/09/05/nicholas-ii-assumes-command-of-the-russian-imperial-army-1915/
²² https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/civilian-and-military-power-germany/
²⁴ https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/world-war-i/
²⁵ https://www.gw2ru.com/history/2769-3-effective-russian-generals-wwi
²⁶ https://www.alexanderpalace.org/2006pierre/chapter_XV.html
²⁷ https://www.dw.com/en/how-germany-got-the-russian-revolution-off-the-ground/a-41195312
²⁸ https://www.alexanderpalace.org/palace/pipesrevolution.php
²⁹ https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSassembly.htm
³⁰ https://youtu.be/Wt_Pl0jFBHk?t=220
³¹ https://www.jstor.org/stable/153303
³² Nove, Alec. An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991. 3rd ed. London: Penguin Books, 1992
³⁵ https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1g69xfv.13?seq=4
³⁶ https://firstutahbank.com/the-history-of-banking-from-ancient-times-to-now/
³⁷ https://www.jstor.org/stable/2493038
³⁸ https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tyrant
³⁹ https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsarist_autocracy#Criticism_of_the_concept
⁴⁰ https://youtu.be/Cqbleas1mmo
⁴¹ https://mashable.com/feature/exiles-convicts-siberia
⁴⁴ https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-16941-2_6
⁴⁵ https://immigrationhistory.org/item/1903-anti-anarchist-legislation/ &
⁴ https://www.amnesty.org.uk/guantanamo-bay-human-rights &
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penal_colony
⁴⁸ https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/drug-haida-banishment-frank-young-1.7523993
⁴⁹ https://dokumen.pub/from-okhrana-to-kgb.html
⁵⁰ https://theintercept.com/2019/10/22/terrorism-fbi-political-dissent/
⁵¹ Hingley, Ronald. The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, imperial Russian and Soviet political security operations, 1565-1970. London: Hutchinson, 1970.
⁵² https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/constituent-assembly/
⁵³ See the term Stagism
https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/s/t.htm
⁵⁴ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546549408575625
⁵⁵ https://youtu.be/Oz9kfoGR6YQ
⁵⁶ https://tsarnicholas.org/2021/04/21/new-documentary-series-defends-the-reign-of-nicholas-ii/
⁵⁷ https://listverse.com/2021/11/14/10-biggest-myths-about-rasputin-that-people-still-believe-today/
⁵⁸ https://www.history.co.uk/articles/6-rasputin-myths-debunked
⁵⁹ https://tsarnicholas.org/2020/09/24/then-they-repented-of-slandering-the-tsar/
⁶⁰ https://www.hemophilia.ca/precautions-in-hemophilia/
⁶¹ https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/the-power-of-the-placebo-effect
You left out his persecution of his Jewish subjects, most of whome were as loyal as any other. This is personal for me as my ancestors were forced to flee his empire following the pogroms that came after the 1905 revolution and the end of the Russo Japanese war.
A very well done article! keep publishing it! Thanks for presenting this other (and true) side of Czar Nicolau II.